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NOTES
OVER THE EDGE: STATE TAXATION OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE
WAKE OF BARCLAYS
Under the Due Process' and Commerce 2 Clauses of the United
States Constitution, states are not permitted to tax income of non-
residents on "value earned outside the taxing state's borders."3
However, where there is a high degree of interrelationship be-
tween one corporation, usually a parent corporation and its corpo-
rate subsidiaries, the corporation will be deemed "unitary" for tax-
ation purposes.4 States are permitted to tax a unitary business on
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
.... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... ." Id.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the state has the power
to choose what state tax to apply to interstate and multinational commerce under the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause. Id.; see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct.
2268, 2276 (1994).
3 ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
4 See PMD Investment Co. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 216 Neb. 553, 556 (1984). Courts
apply various tests to determine whether a business is unitary. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation and Revenue Dep't of N.M., 458 U.S. 354, 364 (1982). "If factors of profitability
arising from operation of business as a whole, such as functional integration, centralization
of management, and economies of scale exist, [there is] evidence [of a] unitary business
... ." Id.; Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1941). Under one test, a busi-
ness is unitary if there is: "(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation as evidenced by
central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use
343
344 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:343
income derived from business activity with a "substantial nexus"
to the taxing state.5 Hence, the "unitary/non-unitary" distinction
presents a significant issue with respect to state taxation of a mul-
tistate or multinational corporation ("MNC").6
When a business operates in more than one state or country, it
is often difficult to determine what portion of its income is attribu-
table to a particular state.7 Accordingly, a state employs one of
two methods to determine what portion of income from the mul-
in its centralized executive force and general system of operation." Id.; David Greenberg,
California's Franchises Tax Board: A Bull in the International China Shop-Barclays
Bank International, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 6 TRANSNAT'L LAw 463, 466 (1993).
Another more encompassing test deems a business unitary if the operation of the busi-
ness within the state contributes to or is dependent upon the operation of the business
outside of the state. See Edison California Stores v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1947);
see also Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 21 (1988). "A unitary business
is one which [is] 'carried on partly within and partly without a state where the portion of
the business carried on within the state depends on or contributes to the business outside
the state.'" Id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 422.32(5) (1987)).
5 See Amerada Hess Corp. v. New Jersey Dep't of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 66 (1989) (arriv-
ing at conclusion that substantial nexus exists where each of company's in-state operations
are part of integrated "unitary business"). Generally, any significant amount of contact
with the taxing state is considered a "substantial nexus." See, e.g., D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v.
McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 25 (1988) (finding substantial nexus where business, conducted
outside state's borders, directly influences its presence within taxing state and business
had significant presence in state with respect to number of stores and sales volume); De-
partment of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 763
(1978) (holding that substantial nexus company avails itself of police and fire protection,
among other benefits taxing state offers). But see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct.
1904, 1904 (1992) (stating that mere contact by mail or common carrier is not enough to
show substantial nexus with taxing state).
6 See, e.g., Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1983) (holding
business to be unitary where capital flow from taxpayer to its subsidiaries was significant
and managerial role played by taxpayer in subsidiaries' affairs was substantial); Honolulu
Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 386 P.2d 40, 45 (Cal. 1963) (concluding that California oil
company with large amounts of production in California and limited operations outside of
California was not unitary business); Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 386 P.2d 33, 39
(Cal. 1963) (holding that California corporation which sold all of its California produced
petroleum in California and all of its petroleum produced outside of California was unitary
and was therefore subject to California's unitary tax).
Through the years, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished between the
various types of MNCs. See, e.g., Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct.
2268, 2271 (1994). There are three types of MNCs-(i) Domestic-based MNCs: MNCs domi-
ciled in the United States with overseas subsidiaries. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 162.
(Container Corp. was a Delaware corporation doing business in several states with a
number of overseas subsidiaries); (ii) Domestic MNCs with foreign parents. See Alcan Alu-
minum, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 890 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 114 U.S. 2737
(1994) (involving two foreign corporations-Canadian company and English company-
with American subsidiaries domiciled in Ohio and Delaware, respectively, who were doing
business in California); and (iii) Foreign corporations with foreign parents or foreign sub-
sidiaries. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2274 (Barclays was a foreign corporation suing on behalf
of Barcal and BBI, two of its domestic subsidiaries). The Supreme Court has held that
unitary taxation is constitutional when applied to all three types of MNCs. Barclays, 114 S.
Ct. at 2286.
7 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 164. "[Alrriving at precise territorial allocations of
'value' is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in practice." Id.
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tijurisdictional business it is entitled to tax: the "arms-length/sep-
arate accounting" ("arms-length") method or the "unitary busi-
ness/formula apportionment" ("unitary") method.,
The arms-length method allows the state to tax an MNC only on
income that the corporation reports on its own books, treating it
as if it were an independent corporation involved in arm's length
transactions with its affiliates. 9 This method is employed by the
federal government, 0 a majority of states,1' and most foreign na-
tions. 12 However, critics claim that the arms-length method is un-
reliable because it taxes income derived from transactions be-
tween interdependent affiliates, which makes it impossible to
separate arms-length transactions from closely-related transac-
tions. 13 Another criticism of the arms-length method is that it al-
lows corporations to use manipulative accounting methods to shel-
ter income in states or countries with lower tax rates.14
Rather than using the arms-length method of taxation, a minor-
ity of states, including California, 15 use the unitary method of tax-
ation, 16 which applies a "three-factor" model called the "world-
wide combined reporting" ("WWCR") method to apportion income
8 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (1994) (distinguishing arms-length taxation method
from unitary taxation method).
9 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185 (stating that arms-length method treats all busi-
nesses as separate entities for taxation purposes); Greenberg, supra note 4, at 466. The
arms-length method treats the subsidiaries as if they were completely unrelated to the
multinational corporation. Id. at 185. Hence, any income derived from transactions with
the parent company is treated as income from outside sources. Id.
10 See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 466.
11 See infra note 17 (listing revenue codes of those states with unitary tax provisions).
Only eight states currently have provisions for unitary taxation of MNCs in their codes. Id.
12 Id.
13 See Elizabeth Harris, Desperate for Revenue: The States' Unconstitutional Use of the
Unitary Method to Apportion the Taxable Income of Foreign Parent Corporations, 19 HAs-
TnINGS CONST. L.Q. 1077, 1079-80 (1992) (discussing differences between unitary tax
method and arms-length method).
14 Id. at 1079 (discussing states' arguments against arms-length taxation method on
ground that MNCs can shelter income). See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2272. "[U]nitary taxa-
tion 'rejects geographical or transactional accounting,' which is 'subject to manipulation'
and does not fully capture 'the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value
that take place among the components of a single enterprise.'" Id. (quoting Container
Corp., 463 U.S. at 164-65). For example, if an MNC has two subsidiaries, one in State A,
where the tax rate is 20% and one in State B, where the tax rate is 30%, that MNC will
attempt to manipulate its accounting records to show that the majority of its income was
produced in State A, the state with the lower tax rate.
15 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 25110 (West 1994).
16 See infra notes 17-27 and 99-103 and accompanying text (describing two methods of
unitary taxation: worldwide combined reporting and water's edge method).
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of multijurisdictional unitary corporations. 17 Under the WWCR
method, a state divides the property, payroll, and sales of the sub-
sidiary operating within the taxing state by the property, payroll,
and sales of the entire MNC.1 8 This percentage is then multiplied
by the MNC's total amount of worldwide income to determine the
appropriate amount of income the state may tax.19
For more than a decade, controversy has centered on states' use
of the unitary taxation method.2 ° States that employ the unitary
17 See Harris, supra note 13, at 1077-78. Alaska, California, Maryland, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wisconsin still have unitary taxation provisions in
their codes. Id.; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.065 (1990); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110
(West 1994); MD. CODE ANN. § 10-402 (1957 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 290.17,
290.34 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-31-301 (1974 & Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 77-2734.09 (1943 & Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-12 (1983 & Supp. 1991). But
see Walter Hellerstein, Selected Issues in State Business Taxation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1033,
1034-35 (1986) [hereinafter Selected Issues] (stating that, after Container Corp., many
state legislatures adopted unitary tax legislation only to repeal it as result of pressure from
business community). Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Oregon, and Utah once had unitary taxation provisions in their codes, but no longer use the
unitary method. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-303 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.135
(West 1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-3-2-2 (1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 63, § 38 (1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 77A:3 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 314.280, 314.650 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 59-13-78 (1986); see also Kristen Schlenger, State Worldwide Unitary Taxation: The For-
eign Parent Case, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 445 n.2 (1984). The "three part" formula
used by the California Franchise Tax Board is one of the most commonly used by states
implementing the unitary tax laws. Id. The "three part" formula is as follows:
In State Property + In State Payroll + In State Sales
Total Property Total Payroll Total Sales * Total Income TaxableCorporate =
3 income By The State
Id. (citing Comptroller General Report, Key Issues Affecting State Taxation of Multijuris.
dictional Corporate Income Need Resolving (Report to Chairman, House Committee on
Ways and Means)).
18 See Harris, supra note 13, at 1080.
By way of example, if the property, payroll, and sales of the foreign MNC amount to
$100,000 and the property, payroll, and sales of one of its subsidiaries based in the United
States amount to $50,000, the subsidiary is deemed to represent 50% of the MNC. Accord-
ingly, the subsidiary will be taxed on 50% of the aggregate income of the entire MNC, as
opposed to being taxed on only the income that would otherwise be attributed to the
subsidiary.
19 Harris, supra note 13, at 1080.
For example:
Prop.,Payrl., Actual Income Tax Tax
Sales % Income (WWCR) Rate Paid
MNC $100,000 n/a 20 mil. 20 mil. 30% 6 mil.
Subsid. 50,000 50% 4 mil. 10 mil. 30% 3 mil.
The income under the WWCR method is $6 million more than what the subsidiary would
have otherwise claimed in income ($4 million). This is because it is deemed to represent
50% of the MNC and is therefore taxed on 50% of the MNC's income. Note that the subsidi-
ary would have only paid $1.2 million ($4 mil. x 30% tax rate) in taxes if the WWCR
method had not been applied.
20 See Nicholas S. Freud & Walter M. Kolligs, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Worldwide
Reporting and Unitary Taxation, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 340, 340 (1994) (stating that few contro-
versies relating to United States tax policy have caused as much international friction as
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taxation method claim that this method of taxation most closely
resembles the actual activities of MNCs and is therefore the best
way of avoiding tax evasion. 2' However, the unitary taxation
method is not without its problems. Arriving at a precise alloca-
tion of an MNC's income is often an unrealistic goal.22 Moreover,
the unitary method could create multiple taxation because it taxes
income that other jurisdictions may have already taxed.23
California's liberal WWCR method is the most controversial of
the unitary methods because it taxes unitary corporations based
on a percentage of worldwide income, which tends to overestimate
the corporation's domestic income.24 Recently, in Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Board,25 the Supreme Court of the United
States found California's unitary tax method constitutional as ap-
unitary tax method); Selected Issues, supra note 17, at 1034 (stating that 'iflor years the
states and the business community have been at loggerheads over the justifiability and
constitutionality of the states' efforts to require corporations to report their income on a
worldwide basis").
21 See Schlenger, supra note 17, at 446-47. The states argue that the arms-length
method allows MNCs to distort trade pricing. Id. Thus, the states claim that the unitary
method more closely resembles the activities of MNCs than the arms-length method. Id. at
447; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980) (stating
that "linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-busi-
ness principle"); Harris, supra note 13, at 1077 (declaring that states believe arms-length
method used by federal government is unreliable when applied to multistate or multina-
tional corporations). Additionally, because unitary taxation is based on a proportion of a
corporation's worldwide income, corporations cannot shelter income in states with lower
tax rates. Id.
22 See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983) (stating that de-
termining MNC's precise income is elusive goal); see also Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 430 (ex-
plaining that because profit is made throughout entire operation, it is misleading to iden-
tify one particular source of income).
23 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2279-80 (1994). MNCs
argue that, more often than not, the unitary tax method results in double taxation. Id.; see
also, Freud & Kolligs, supra note 20, at 344; Harris, supra note 13, at 1091. "Foreign-based
companies, in the interest of economy and efficiency, often perform many functions outside
the United States and relatively few activities within the United States." Id. The author
draws the distinction between income-producing activities "outside the borders of the state
[or country]" and those inside the borders. Id.
The threat of double taxation is greater for foreign-based MNCs than for domestic-based
MNCs. See Freud & Kolligs, supra note 20, at 344. For example, in Barclays, out of a group
of 220 entities, only three companies did any business in the United States. Id. at 344 n.15.
Although unitary taxation may be the best method for multistate corporations, some
states believe this is unfair when applied to MNCs. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-13-13 (1972
& Supp. 1993) (noting that Mississippi applies unitary method only to multistate corpora-
tions, not to MNCs); see also Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 159
(1983) (stating burden is on taxpayer to prove double-taxation by clear and convincing
evidence).
24 See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 466 (stating that no other state tax system has caused
more friction between international business community and state taxing agencies than
California's unitary apportionment formula).
25 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
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plied to a foreign parent corporation. 26 The Court held that Cali-
fornia's WWCR method violated neither the Due Process Clause
nor the Commerce Clause.27
Nonetheless, due to a global attack and political pressure on the
WWCR method, all unitary tax states have modified their revenue
codes to allow MNCs to elect a "water's edge" approach to unitary
taxation.28 The water's edge taxation method limits the income
used to compute a property, payroll, and sales percentage to in-
come earned within the United States, rather than worldwide.29
Although the water's edge method appears to be a middle ground
between the arms-length and WWCR methods, some threat of for-
eign retaliation still remains.30 Therefore, it is possible that Con-
26 Id. at 2286. Prior to Barclays, the Supreme Court had only upheld the constitutional-
ity of the unitary taxation method in cases involving United States parent MNCs and mul-
tistate corporations. See, e.g., Itel Containers Intl Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095,
1096 (1993) (upholding Tennessee sales tax on containers used by domestic corporation in
international trade); Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 3 (1986)
(upholding Florida's unitary tax on MNCs); Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159, 159 (1983) (stat-
ing that California's application of its WWCR tax method on Container Corp., domestic
MNC, was proper); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 309 (1982)
(Idaho Tax Commission levied tax on New Jersey corporation); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 427 (1980) (holding Vermont's tax on domestic corporation's
dividends received from foreign subsidiaries constitutional); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977) (holding constitutional Mississippi sales tax on Michigan
multistate corporation); Bass, Rattcliff & Gutton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271,
284 (1924) (upholding New York tax on MNC for doing business in New York); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920) (explaining unitary tax was con-
stitutional, as long as its payment was not condition of carrying on business within state).
But see Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 641 (1984) (arguing that unitary tax was
unconstitutional because it unfairly discriminated against interstate commerce); Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 457 (1979) (holding unitary tax unconsti-
tutional because it resulted in multiple taxation and was preempted by Congress's power to
regulate foreign commerce). In Container Corp., the Supreme Court hinted that, if applied
to a foreign parent MNC, the unitary method may violate the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Container Corp., 463 U.S at 185-86; see also Greenberg, supra note 4, at 446. Yet, when the
Court actually decided this issue in Barclays it declared unitary taxation constitutional
when applied to both multistate and multinational corporations. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at
2268.
27 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2277-78 (stating that Barclays Bank did not demonstrate that
California tax was unconstitutional).
2s Id. at 2273. The water's edge alternative was eventually adopted by all states that had
previously used only the unitary taxation method. Id. California was nearly the last state
to adopt the water's edge method. Id. It was not until 1993 that California modified its
franchise tax statutes to allow for a water's edge election without the payment of a fee. Id.
Hence, water's edge election was not an alternative for Barclays during the time period at
issue in the Barclays case due to the state's unfair requirements. Id.; see also infra notes
99-103 and accompanying text (explaining water's edge method of taxation).
29 See Freud & Kolligs, supra note 20, at 341-42.
30 See id., at 344. Although "water's edge" taxation may provide a middle ground, it is
probable that some foreign MNCs would rather be taxed under the arm's-length method.
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gress will legislate in the future against state use of the unitary
taxation method. 31
Part One of this Note reviews the United States Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the constitutionality of unitary taxation
methods. Part Two discusses the water's edge approach to uni-
tary taxation and its effect on foreign relations. Finally, Part
Three examines the possibility that Congress will legislate
against unitary taxation and concludes that congressional legisla-
tion compelling states to abolish unitary taxation would be uncon-
stitutional and therefore void as a matter of law.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNITARY TAXATION METHOD
The Commerce Clause explicitly gives Congress power "to regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States."32 This clause has been interpreted as a source of protec-
tion against state legislation that restricts interstate commerce,
even in areas where Congress has not acted.3 3 The Commerce
Clause, however, does not shelter interstate commerce from its
fair share of the state tax burden.34 The Supreme Court has devel-
oped various tests in response to disputes surrounding the consti-
tutionality of unitary taxation.31
In the 1977 case of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 6 the
United States Supreme Court held Mississippi's unitary taxation
of multistate corporations on a "formula-apportionment" basis to
be constitutional under the Commerce Clause.3 v Complete Auto
Transit was a Michigan corporation transporting automobiles into
31 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2282 (1994).
32 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Com-
merce Clause).
33 See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)(explaining that state legislature has some say under Commerce Clause when Congress
has not spoken); South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S.
177, 184-85 (1938) (stating that although Commerce Clause curtails some state power, it
does not deny all state action in interstate commerce).
34 Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734,
750 (1978) (citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (ex-
plaining that interstate commerce must also contribute to state taxation)).
35 For a description of these tests, see supra notes 9-31 and accompanying text.
36 430 U.S. 276 (1977).
37 Id. at 288-89. The Court overruled its decision in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951). Id. In Spector, the Court held that although a state can tax a corpora-
tion for the "privilege of doing business" in the state, it would be unconstitutional to tax a
multistate corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce based on this "privilege of
doing business" rationale. 430 U.S. at 289 (citing Spector, 340 U.S. at 609-10).
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Mississippi for General Motors Corporation .3  The Mississippi
Tax Commission assessed Complete Auto's taxes to include Com-
plete Auto's sales of motor vehicles manufactured outside of Mis-
sissippi to dealers within that state.3 9 These tax assessments were
derived from Mississippi's tax code, which imposes a tax on busi-
nesses "privileged with doing business" in Mississippi. 40 The
amount of the tax was based on a percentage of Complete Auto's
total gross income.4 1 Complete Auto argued that the Mississippi
tax on its sales of motor vehicles was unconstitutional as applied
to interstate commerce.42 In holding Mississippi's use of a unitary
tax constitutional, the Court rejected the rule that a state may not
tax interstate commerce because such a tax would violate the
Commerce Clause.43 Rather, the Court held that a state unitary
tax on interstate commerce does not violate the Commerce Clause
unless it can be shown that one of the following circumstances ex-
ists: (1) the activity being taxed lacks a "substantial nexus" to the
taxing state; (2) the tax is not fairly apportioned; (3) the tax dis-
criminates against interstate commerce; or (4) the tax does not
fairly relate to the services the taxing state provides.4 The
Supreme Court held that the Mississippi tax was constitutional
because none of these four circumstances existed.45
In 1979, the Supreme Court established a more stringent test
with respect to state taxation of a corporation involved in foreign
38 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 276, 276 (1977). The automobiles
were assembled outside of Mississippi by Complete Auto. Id. In addition, the Mississippi
Supreme Court noted that Complete Auto had a large operation in Mississippi and was
dependent upon Mississippi for police protection and other Mississippi services, the same
as other citizens. Id. at 277 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So. 2d 268,
272 (Miss. 1971)).
39 430 U.S. at 276-77. The Commission concluded that Complete Auto owed taxes and
interest totaling $122,160.59 for the three-year period starting August 1, 1968 and ending
July 31, 1971. Id. at 277.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 275. Complete Auto argued that the imposition of this tax on multistate
commerce created an unacceptable risk of discrimination and an undue burden. Id. How-
ever, Complete Auto did not argue that its business did not have a substantial nexus to
Mississippi, that the imposition of this tax would in fact discriminate against multistate
corporations, that the tax was not apportioned fairly, or that it was unrelated to the serv-
ices provided by Mississippi. Id. at 277-78; see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-13 (1972 &
Supp. 1993).
42 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277.
43 Id. at 287-89 (rejecting rule of Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. O'Connor, 304 U.S. 602
(1951) that state taxation on interstate commerce is per se unconstitutional).
44 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. (setting forth analysis necessary to determine
whether taxation applied to interstate commerce is constitutional).
45 Id. at 289 (holding Mississippi tax on interstate commerce constitutional as applied).
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commerce.4 6 In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,47 Cali-
fornia applied an ad valorem property tax48 on containers owned
by six Japanese shipping corporations, including Japan Line, Ltd.
("Japan Line").49 The corporations used the vessels to accommo-
date containers owned by Japan Line. 50 The Court concluded that
California's tax on these companies led to "double taxation" be-
cause the property of these companies already was subject to taxa-
tion in Japan.5 1 In holding that it was unconstitutional to apply a
state tax to these corporations, the Court reasoned that although
California had met the Complete Auto criteria, the state was re-
quired to meet two additional criteria.52 To survive Commerce
Clause scrutiny, the state unitary tax must not: (1) create a sub-
stantial risk of double taxation; or (2) prevent the federal govern-
ment from "speak[ing] with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments."5 3 The United States Consti-
tution gives Congress the power to "speak with one voice" in rela-
tion to foreign policy and affairs.54 A state law conflicts with Con-
gress's power to "speak with one voice" when the state law directly
46 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1994). "In 'the
unique context of foreign commerce,' a State's power is further constrained because of 'the
special need for federal uniformity.'" Id. (quoting Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of
Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
446-47 (1979).
47 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
48 See, e.g., Callaway v. City of Overland Park, 508 P.2d 902, 907 (Kan. 1973) (defining
ad valorem tax as tax imposed on property in proportion to its value based on assessment
or appraisal).
49 441 U.S. at 436-37. There were six corporations, all were incorporated, domiciled, and
had their principal place of business in Japan. Id. at 436. The corporation's containers, for
which California imposed an ad valorem property tax, were used solely in foreign com-
merce. Id. at 437.
50 Id. The vessels and the containers were in constant movement and were only used in
foreign commerce. Id. A container is permanent equipment used to facilitate the movement
of goods in commerce. Id. at 436 n. 1.
51 Id. at 438. The vessels and containers were based, registered, and subject to property
tax in Japan. Id. at 437-38. The Court explained that the containers' stay in California was
not permanent and only lasted for about three weeks. Id. at 437. In addition, the containers
were not used in any activities while in California. Id. In fact, the containers stopped in
California only as a continuation of international excursions related to the efficiency of
Japan Line's commerce. Id.
52 Id. at 446 (setting forth additional considerations with respect to foreign commerce).
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276-77 (1994) (discussing
considerations needed when challenging tax on multinational corporations).
53 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 434 (1979) (citing Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)); see also, Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276 (apply-
ing two additional Japan Line considerations with respect to California's WWCR taxation
method).
54 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
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impacts foreign relations and adversely affects the central govern-
ment's power to deal with these relationships.5 5
In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,56 de-
cided four years after Japan Line, the United States Supreme
Court held California's unitary method of taxation constitutional
with respect to a domestic-based multinational corporation doing
business in the state.57 Container Corporation of America
("Container Corporation") was a largely domestic corporation in
the business of manufacturing paperboard packaging.", Container
Corporation controlled twenty foreign subsidiaries located in four
European and four Latin American countries.59 In filing its Cali-
fornia income tax returns, however, Container Corporation did
not include the income derived from any of its subsidiaries.60 The
California Franchise Tax Board audited these tax returns and as-
sessed that, under California's unitary tax laws, Container Corpo-
ration owed over $71,000 in taxes."'
After concluding that Container Corporation was a unitary
business subject to California's WWCR (three-factor formula),6 2
55 See id. at 441; see also Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448. "In international relations and
with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a
single government with unified and adequate national power." Id. (quoting Board of Trust-
ees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)).
56 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
57 Id. at 159.
58 Id. at 171.
59 Id.
60 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 174.
61 See id. Container Corporation's calculations for the three years at issue were as
follows:
Percentage Amount
Total attributed to attributed to Tax
Income California California (5.5%)
1963 $26,870,427 11.041 $2,966,764 $163,172
1964 28,774,320 10.6422 3,062,221 168,442
1965 32,280,843 9.8336 3,174,369 174,590
Id. at 174 n.ll. After treating Container Corporation's overseas subsidiaries as part of its
unitary business, the Franchise Tax Board assessed Container Corporation's income at:
Total
Income of Percentage Amount
unitary attributed to attributed to Tax
business California California (5.5%)
1963 $37,348,183 8.6886 $3,245,034 $178,477
1964 44,245,879 8.3135 3,673,381 202,311
1965 46,884,996 7.6528 3,558,012 197,341*
* These numbers have been rounded to the nearest dollar.
Id. at 175 n.12.
62 Id. at 184 (holding California's application of unitary taxation fair, despite fact that it
differed from federal method of taxation).
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the Court applied the Japan Line test to determine whether the
additional taxes were constitutional under the Commerce
Clause.63 In addressing the issue of multiple taxation, the Court
concluded that multiple taxation was not the inevitable result of
the California tax, 4 and that the alternative which was reason-
ably available to the taxing state could not eliminate the risk of
double taxation.65 The Court then determined that unitary taxa-
tion, as applied to domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries,
did not violate the "one voice" standard.
66
Accordingly, the Court found California's unitary taxation con-
stitutional with respect to a domestic corporation with foreign
subsidiaries. 67 However, the Court in Container Corp. failed to ad-
dress the constitutionality of the unitary method as it applied to
63 See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185 (1983). The Court noted
that this additional scrutiny is required when the business at issue is international, rather
than wholly domestic. Id.; see also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing
Japan Line test).
64 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 188. The Court stated: "[T]he double taxation in this
case, although real, is not the 'inevitabl[e]' result of the California taxing scheme." Id. (cit-
ing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447). The Court stated:
[W]e are faced with two distinct methods of allocating the income of a multi-national
enterprise. The arms'-length approach divides the pie on the basis of a mathematical
generalization. Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same in-
come being taxed twice or in some portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent
solely on the facts of the individual case.
463 U.S. at 188.
65 Id. at 191. Although most nations have adopted the arms-length method of taxation,
the rules under which income is reallocated among affiliated corporations often differs sub-
stantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possibility of double taxation also exits.
Id. Therefore, even if California were to adopt the arms-length approach, it could not elimi-
nate the risk of double taxation, and could in some cases result in more serious double
taxation than would occur under formula apportionment. Id.
66 Id. at 194-95. The Court distinguished Japan Line, noting that "the tax here does not
create an automatic asymmetry." Id. The Court also noted that, unlike the tax in Japan
Line, the tax in Container Corp. was imposed on a domestic, not foreign, corporation, there-
fore eliminating the threat of foreign retaliation that existed in Japan Line. Id. at 195.
Finally, the Court stated:
[Elven if foreign nations have a legitimate interest in reducing the tax burden of do-
mestic corporations, the fact remains that [Container Corporation] is without a doubt
amenable to be taxed in California in one way or another, and that the amount of tax it
pays is much more the function of California's tax rate than of its allocation method.
Although a foreign nation might be more offended by what it considers unorthodox
treatment of [Container Corporation] than it would be if California simply raised its
general tax rate to achieve the same economic result, we can only assume that the
offense involved in either event would be attenuated at best.
Id. The Court also determined that there was no congressional intent to preempt Califor-
nia's unitary tax method. Id. at 196.
67 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 197 (concluding that California's taxation method is
neither preempted by federal law nor inconsistent with federal policy).
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domestic corporations with foreign parents or to foreign corpora-
tions with foreign parents, or foreign subsidiaries. 68
Recently, in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of Cali-
fornia,69 the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of California's unitary taxation of a foreign MNC. 70 The
Court held that the state's unitary taxation did not expose foreign
MNCs to "constitutionally intolerable multiple taxation"71 and did
not "prevent the Federal Government from speaking with 'one
voice' in international trade."7 2
Barclays Bank PLC ("Barclays") is a United Kingdom Corpora-
tion in the Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise.7v
Two of Barclays' California branches, Barcal and Barclays Bank
International ("BBI"), claimed that California's unitary taxation
burdened foreign-based multinationals and resulted in double tax-
ation, in violation of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses by
interfering with the federal government's ability to "speak with
one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments."74
68 Id. at 195 n.32. The Court stated:
We recognize that the fact that the legal incidence of a tax falls on a corporation whose
formal corporate domicile is domestic might be less significant in the case of a domestic
corporation that was owned by foreign interests. We need not decide here whether
such a case would require us to alter our analysis.
Id.
69 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
70 Id. at 2286 (upholding California's unitary tax and stating that Congress, not judici-
ary, should determine whether allowing unitary taxation is in nation's best interest).
71 Id. (refusing to favor separate accounting methods over unitary method because all
result in some form of multiple taxation).
72 Id. at 2284 (upholding California's unitary tax in light of fact that Congress has not
acted to abolish it).
73 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2271.
74 Id. at 2274. Barclays Group consisted of 220 corporations doing business in 60 na-
tions. Id. The two members of Barclays that brought suit did business in California and
were therefore subject to California's franchise tax. Id. Barclays Bank of California ("Bar-
cal"), one of the taxpayers, was a California bank owned by Barclays Bank International
("BBI"), the second taxpayer. Id. BBI was a United Kingdom corporation that did business
in the United Kingdom and 33 other territories. Id. Barcal reported only the income from
its own operations on its 1977 tax return, and BBI reported its income "on the assumption
that it participated in a unitary business composed of itself and its subsidiaries, but not its
parent corporation and the parent's other subsidiaries." Id.
California's Franchise Tax Board assessed that both Barcal and BBI were multinational
unitary businesses subject to additional tax liability of $1,678 and $152,420 respectively.
Id. The figures used by the Tax Board were:
Worldwide
Taxable Calif. Formula Business Franchise
Income Percentage Income Tax
Barcal $401,566,973 .0139032% $5,583,066 $693,696
BBI $401,566,973 .0003232% 129,786 16,126
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The United States Supreme Court found that both Barcal and
BBI had clearly met the four criteria for state taxation of a mul-
tijurisdictional unitary business as set forth in Complete Auto.v5
Next, the Court proceeded to determine whether the tax would
pass the "additional scrutiny" required by Japan Line when a
state attempts to tax foreign commerce .76 First, the Court consid-
ered "the enhanced risk of multiple taxation," relying heavily on
its decision in Container Corp. to hold unitary taxation constitu-
Id. at 2274 n.6. After paying the assessments, Barcal and BBI sued for refunds. Id. at 2274.
California's lower courts ruled in favor of Barcal and BBI, but the California Supreme
Court held that the tax did not interfere with the federal government's ability to "speak
with one voice in regulating foreign commerce ... and therefore did not violate the Com-
merce Clause." Id. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeal for further development of Barclays' compliance claim. Id. (citing Barclays
Bank Intl, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2 Cal. 4th 708, cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1992)).
In addition to its claim that California's tax interfered with the federal government's abil-
ity to "speak with one voice in regulating foreign commerce," Barclays claimed that "the
compliance burden on foreign-based multinationals imposed by California's tax violated
both the Due Process Clause and the nondiscrimination requirement of the Commerce
Clause." Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2274.
On remand, the Court of Appeal decided the compliance issue in favor of the Tax Board,
and the California Supreme Court denied further review. Id. The United States Supreme
Court then granted a writ of certiorari to the California Court of Appeal. Id.
75 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1994). See supra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text for Complete Auto criteria. The Court held that: the
"nexus" requirement was met by the business each corporation conducted in California
over the years in question; the "fair apportionment" requirement was satisfied by Barclays'
failure to establish a lack of a "rational relationship between the income attributed to the
State and the intrastate values of the enterprise"; and the income attributed to California
was "fairly related" to the proportion of business conducted by the taxpayers in that state.
Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276.
However, Barclays claimed that California's WWCR method failed to meet the "anti-dis-
crimination" component of the Complete Auto test for two reasons. Id. at 2277. First, Bar-
clays asserted that the foreign parent corporation of a California taxpayer was forced to
convert its worldwide accounting records into the language and currency of the United
States at a "prohibitive" expense in order to comply with California's tax policy. Id. The
trial court found that an accounting system capable of converting Barclays' records to con-
form to California's standards would cost more than $5,000,000 to set up and more than
$2,000,000 per year to maintain. Id. at 2277 n.11. Barclays argued that foreign-based
MNCs were at a competitive disadvantage to domestic-based MNCs, most of which already
kept their records in United States language and currency, resulting in "economic protec-
tionism." Id. at 2277. The United States Supreme Court, however, dismissed this claim on
the premise that California's tax regulations provided that the Tax Board "shall consider
the effort and expense required to obtain the necessary information and ... may accept
reasonable approximations," thereby alleviating the excessive compliance costs complained
of. Id. at 2278. Barclays also argued that California's "reasonable approximations" policy
violated due process because they had no standard against which to measure what approxi-
mations would be accepted as reasonable. Id. at 2272. The Court dismissed this claim as
well, recognizing that California's tax policy allowed the taxpayer to request "an advanced
determination" from the Tax Board with respect to the tax consequences of the taxpayer's
actions. Id. at 2279.
76 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279 (citing Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159, 184) (applying Ja-
pan Line holding to facts in Barclays). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text for
the requirements set forth in Japan Line.
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tional. 7 In Barclays, however, the Court distinguished Container
Corp. on the ground that Container Corp. applied only to taxation
of domestic-based corporations with foreign subsidiaries and not
to foreign MNCs like Barclays.7 The Court noted that because
foreign MNCs hold a larger share of their operations outside the
United States than do domestic MNCs, a higher proportion of
their income is subject to taxation by foreign sovereigns. 79 Never-
theless, the Court concluded that this distinction was insufficient
to justify different standards of taxation based on whether an
MNC was domestic-based or foreign-based.80 Accordingly, the
77 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279 (considering Barclays' argument that Container Corp.
holding applies only to foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations and therefore should
not control their case) (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185).
78 Barclays, 114 S.Ct. at 2274.
79 Id. at 2280. Barclays claimed that "the breadth of double taxation and the degree of
burden on foreign commerce are greater than in the case of domestic multinationals,"
pointing to its own operations and noting that only three of more than 200 affiliates in the
Barclays Group did business in the United States. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 33,
Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384)). In consid-
ering this argument, the Court relied on Container Corp.'s two-part holding. Id. (citing
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 188). First, the Container Corp. Court held that double taxa-
tion was not the "inevitable result" of California's unitary tax. 114 S. Ct. at 2280 (citing
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 188). The Court noted:
The double taxation in this case, although real, is not the "inevitable" result of the
California taxing scheme .... We are faced with two distinct methods of allocating the
income of a multinational enterprise.... Whether the combination of the two methods
results in the same income being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the
individual case.
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 188. Second, the Container Corp. Court held that the "alterna-
tive reasonably available to the State [that is the arms-length approach] could not elimi-
nate the risk of double taxation" and could increase that risk. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2280.
The Court stated:
We do not question Barclays assertion that multinational enterprises with a high pro-
portion of income taxed by jurisdictions with wage rates, property values, and sales
prices lower than California's face a correspondingly high risk of multiple interna-
tional taxation... But Container Corp.'s approval of this very tax, in the face of a
multiple taxation challenge, did not rest on any insufficiency in the evidence that mul-
tiple taxation might occur; indeed, we accepted in that case the taxpayer's assertion
that multiple taxation in fact had occurred.
Id. at 2279-80. The Court further noted:
Even though most nations have adopted the arm's length approach in its general out-
lines, the precise rules under which they reallocate income among affiliated corpora-
tions often differ substantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possibility of
double taxation also exists... California would have trouble avoiding multiple taxa-
tion even if it adopted the arm's length approach....
Id. at 2280 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 192).
80 114 S. Ct. at 2280 (holding that because arms-length accounting system does not nec-
essarily decrease risk of multiple taxation of income earned by foreign affiliates of domes-
tic-owned corporations, as decided in Container Corp., there is no reason to assume that
arms-length method would decrease multiple taxation with respect to foreign affiliates of
foreign-owned corporations).
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Court held that California's tax scheme did not create a substan-
tial risk of multiple taxation with respect to Barclays."'
Next, the Court decided the most pressing issue presented in
Barclays: whether California's WWCR method interfered with the
federal government's ability to "speak with one voice in interna-
tional trade." 2 The Court relied on two cases to make this deter-
mination . 3 First, the Court looked to Container Corp., where it
found no specific indication of congressional intent to preempt
California's tax.84 Second, the Court rejected the Commerce
Clause challenge of state taxation that had been presented to the
Court in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Reve-
nue.8 5 In Wardair, the Court noted that although there were fed-
eral policies and bilateral agreements that prohibited tax impedi-
ments to foreign air travel, those policies and agreements applied
to the federal government, not to the states, and therefore did not
interfere with the federal government's ability to "speak with one
"86voice.
81 Id. "If... adoption of a separate accounting system does not dispositively lessen the
risk of multiple taxation of the income earned by foreign affiliates of domestic-owned corpo-
rations, we see no reason why it would do so [with] respect [to] the income earned by for-
eign affiliates of foreign-owned corporations." Id.
82 Id. at 2280. The Court addressed whether California's WWCR method "impair[ed] fed-
eral uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential?" Id. (quoting Japan Line,
441 U.S. at 448)
83 114 S. Ct. at 2279-81 (reviewing holdings in Container Corp. and Wardair Canada
Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986)).
84 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281. "Congress has long debated, but has not enacted, legisla-
tion designed to regulate state taxation of income." Id. (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S.
at 196-197). The Container Corp. holding was based on three facts: (1) federal tax statutes
did not preempt California's tax methods; (2) although the United States had entered into
various tax treaties with multinationals requiring that the federal government adopt arms-
length taxation methods, that requirement was waived by the contracting multinationals
with respect to domestic corporations; and (3) the restriction on arms-length taxation writ-
ten into the tax treaties applied to the government, not to the states. 114 S. Ct. at 2281-82.
85 477 U.S. 1 (1986). In Wardair, a Canadian airline challenged a Florida state tax on
fuel to common carriers on all aviation fuel purchased in Florida, regardless of the amount
of fuel the carrier consumed within the state. Id. at 4. The airline argued that there was a
"federal policy of reciprocal tax exemptions for aircraft, equipment, and supplies, including
aviation fuel, that constitutes the instrumentalities of international air traffic." Id. at 9.
86 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2282 (discussing Wardair case); see also Schlenger, supra note
17, at 461. The United States has entered into an abundant number of bilateral income tax
treaties. Id. The two goals of United States tax treaties are: (1) to avoid double taxation;
and (2) to avoid discrimination of foreign investment. Id.; see also William C. Gifford, Per-
manent Establishment and the Nondiscrimination Clause in Income Tax Treaties, 11 COR-
NFLL INT'L L.J. 51 passim (1978) (stating that all United States income tax treaties have
nondiscrimination clauses except those treaties with Australia, Italy, and New Zealand).
The United States Senate has, in all tax treaties, expressly stated that the requirement
of an arms-length separating accounting method does not apply to state or local govern-
ments as long as it does not interfere with the federal government's policies. See Schlenger,
supra note 17, at 461.
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Finally, the Court in Barclays noted that in the eleven years
following Container Corp., Congress was not silent regarding the
WWCR method of taxation, but instead had considered the impli-
cations of the various tax methods in the past and had chosen not
to legislate in the area.8 Hence, the Court found no congressional
intent to preempt WWCR taxation and accordingly upheld the
constitutionality of California's unitary tax.88 The Court rein-
forced its decision by stating that issues of state taxation with re-
spect to "the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference."89
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, with whom Justice Clarence
Thomas joined, concurred in the Barclays judgment in part and
dissented in part. 90 Justice O'Connor agreed that, because the
state had relied on the constitutionality of unitary taxation as set
forth in Container Corp., and because Congress had not yet legis-
lated in opposition to that ruling, the Court properly upheld the
Container Corp. decision.9' Justice O'Connor also agreed that be-
cause the legislature had not acted to disapprove the California
tax, the need for federal uniformity did not prevent the state from
applying the unitary taxation method to foreign corporations lo-
cated in the state.92 However, she disagreed with the Court's find-
ing that unitary taxation of foreign-based MNCs did not increase
international multiple taxation. 93 Justice O'Connor distinguished
87 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2283-84 (1994). The Court
noted that Congress had been given the power to regulate foreign commerce under the
Commerce Clause and, although many bills prohibiting the WWCR method of state taxa-
tion had been introduced to Congress, none had been passed. Id.
88 Id. at 2286. The Court upheld the constitutionality of California's unitary tax for four
reasons: (1) Barclays had a substantial nexus with California; (2) WWCR resulted in taxes
which were fair and nondiscriminatory; (3) the tax did not inevitably result in multiple
taxation; and (4) Congress had not preempted state use of the unitary method of taxation.
Id.
89 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2286 (1994) (quoting Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)).
90 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 1187-90.
91 Id. Justice O'Connor stated that although she disagreed with the Court's decision in
Container Corp., it was necessary for the Court to uphold the constitutionality of unitary
taxation because the state and private parties had justifiably relied on the Container Corp.
holding and because Congress had not overruled the Container Corp. decision. Id.
92 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2288 (1994) (noting that
Congress, not Executive or Judiciary, has been given power to regulate commerce).
93 Id. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the trial court had found, as a matter of fact,
that "t]here [was] a definite risk of, as well as actual double taxation [in Barclays case]."
Id. She also stated: "this double taxation occurs because California has adopted a taxing
system that is inconsistent with the taxing method used by foreign taxing authorities." Id.
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Container Corp. on the premise that the risk of multiple taxation
greatly increases when using the unitary method to tax foreign-
based corporations, as opposed to domestic-based corporations.
94
She concluded that the Court could not guarantee full apportion-
ment when one of the taxing entities was a foreign sovereign.95
The Barclays decision reaffirmed the constitutionality of uni-
tary taxation. 96 As a result, the Supreme Court, in 1994, denied
certiorari in five tax cases involving the use of the unitary tax
method on MNCs. 97 Thus, any corporation petitioning for certio-
rari to the United States Supreme Court on a unitary tax claim
must attempt to obtain an appeal by showing that: (1) the corpora-
tion is not a unitary business by definition or (2) unitary taxation
would distort the corporation's income.98
94 Id. at 2289. When WWCR is applied to domestic corporations with foreign affiliates, as
in Container Corp., income attributable to those foreign companies will be taxed by Califor-
nia, even though they are also subject to tax in foreign countries. Id. However, the domestic
parent corporation-a corporation subject to full taxation in the United States notwith-
standing the source of its income-bears the burden of the tax. Id. When a unitary tax is
applied to a foreign corporation with both domestic and foreign affiliates, some of the in-
come of the foreign companies will also be taxed by California. Id. The burden of the tax in
such cases falls on a foreign corporation, even though the United States is entitled to tax
only the income earned domestically. Id.
95 Id. at 2290 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447-48). The Court stated:
Due to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggrega-
tion of taxes is computed on no more than one full value, a state tax, even though
"fairly apportioned" to reflect an instrumentality's presence within the State, may sub-ject foreign commerce to the risk of a double tax burden to which the commerce clause
forbids.
114 S. Ct. at 2290.
96 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2286 (1994).
97 See Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 899 F.2d 16, 16 (7th Cir. 1990) (Ca-
nadian corporation with California subsidiary challenged California's use of unitary tax),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2737 (1994); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 742 F.2d
1430, 1430 (2d Cir. 1983) (foreign corporation challenged California tax on income from its
domestic subsidiary), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2737 (1994); NCR Corp. v. New Mexico Dep't
of Tax'n & Revenue., 856 P.3d 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (Maryland corporation contested
New Mexico's taxation of its New Mexico branch based on percentage of worldwide income),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994); Reuters Ltd. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 180 A.D.2d 270,
270, 584 N.Y.S.2d 932, 932 (3d Dep't 1992) (United Kingdom corporation with branch office
in New York City contested New York's unitary tax assessment, which was based on per-
centage of corporation's worldwide income), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2737 (1994); NCR Corp.
v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue & Tax., 402 S.E.2d 666, 667-68 (S.C. 1991) (domestic
MNC brought action to recover corporate income and license fees after South Carolina ap-
plied unitary tax to corporation's foreign subsidiaries), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994).
98 See Eric J. Cofill, Supreme Court in Barclay's Upholds California's Use of Worldwide
Unitary Method Involving Foreign Parent Corporations, 94 TAx NOTEs TODAY 141-58 n.49
(1994). Factual unity and distortion are issues that will always arise in unitary taxation
cases. Id. The author asserts that a California judicial court can decide whether a corpora-
tion is a "unitary business" by the two tests set forth in California's state law and the
overriding federal constitutional dimension. Id. In addition to factual unity, if a corporation
can prove that the unitary method in that state results in distortion or misappropriation of
the income of the corporation, then the method will be held unconstitutional as applied to
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II. WATER'S EDGE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
Prior to the Barclays decision, political pressure and threats of
foreign retaliation persuaded the California legislature to revise
its revenue code, allowing all unitary corporations to choose either
the WWCR method or the "water's edge" method of taxation.99
The water's edge method appears to be a reasonable substitute for
WWCR. 100 Like the WWCR method, the water's edge method com-
putes income based on a percentage equal to the property, payroll,
and sales of the subsidiary divided by the property, payroll, and
sales of those branches of the MNC that operate within the United
States. 1 1 However, the water's edge method differs from the
WWCR method in that this percentage is then applied to the
MNC's income within the United States, rather than world-
that corporation. Id.; see also Tambrands, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 595 A.2d 1039, 1039
(Me. 1991). The Tambrands court stated that a Delaware corporation with foreign affiliates
constituted a unitary business. Id. In Tambrands, Maine had applied the unitary method
of taxation to one of Tambrands' affiliates. Id. Tambrands argued that the application of
the unitary method was unconstitutional. Id. at 1041. Maine had included dividend income
derived from the foreign affiliates of Tambrands. Id. However, the state did not include the
property, payroll, and sales that generated this income. Id. Thus, Tambrands argued that
the apportionment ratio was higher than it should have been. Id. Further, it argued that
this ratio had been applied toward higher income than the state was permitted to tax. Id.
The court held that this application did distort the tax attributable to the state and was
therefore unconstitutional. Id.
99 See California Amends Water's-Edge Election Under International Pressure, 4 J. INT'L
TAX'N 480, 480 (1993) [hereinafter New Developments] (describing California's modification
of its unitary taxation method).
California first adopted water's edge election in 1988 but required that a corporation
meet stringent conditions before the election could be made. Id. Thus, many multistate and
MNCs still paid taxes under the WWCR method. See Walter Hellerstein, Are Days of
Worldwide Unitary Taxation by States Limited?, 72 J. TAX N 172, 176 (1990).
In 1993, the California legislature, modified its previous water's edge provisions. See
New Developments, supra, at 480. This election allowed MNCs to choose an alternate
method over the WWCR method. Id.; see also Greg Robb, More U.S. States May Try Unitary
Tax After the Barclay's Verdict, AFX NEWS (1994). Under the new provision: (1) a corpora-
tion can make an election without paying a fee; (2) the Franchise Tax Board may not re-
voke an election; and (3) the election period was extended from five years to seven years.
New Developments, supra, at 480. Additionally, the disclosure requirements, when choos-
ing to elect water's edge, were diminished, thereby making the election more appealing. Id.
For example, prior to the amendment, MNCs that chose to make the election were required
to disclose comprehensive information related to their identity, income, and tax liability in
every state, and if a taxpaying company had assets of at least $200 million, it was required
to provide a list of affiliates. Id.
10 See Harris, supra note 13, at 1081 (stating that those states retaining WWCR
method allow corporations to choose water's edge alternative).
101 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273; see also Freud & Kolligs, supra note 20, at 341-42.
Although the states still use a "three-part formula-apportionment" method based on prop-
erty, payroll, and sales, the income of foreign subsidiaries, of foreign parents, or of foreign
transactions are not in this formula. Id.
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wide.1 0 2 All state statutes that presently contain a unitary tax
provision allow MNCs to select either the WWCR method or the
water's edge method.10 3
Although some states have adopted the water's edge method,
the Barclays decision gives the states the authority to demand the
WWCR method when taxing MNCs.10 4 Foreign nations are con-
cerned that this decision will encourage California to repeal its
1993 water's edge provision and persuade other states to enact
mandatory WWCR legislation. 0 5 Yet, such state action is not
likely to occur due to the threat of retaliation by foreign
nations. 106
Many foreign governments have voiced their disapproval of
states' WWCR requirements. 0 7 For example, in 1985, the British
102 See Freud & Kolligs, supra note 20, at 342 (stating that under water's edge method,
foreign MNCs can exclude apportionment factor from its foreign affiliates); Harris, supra
note 13, at 1081.
103 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2273 (1994). All states
have amended their tax systems to allow corporate election of some type that confines com-
bined reporting to the United States. See Walter Hellerstein, Are Days of Worldwide Uni-
tary Taxation by States Limited?, 72 J. TAX'N 172, 176 (1990) [hereinafter Days Limited].
California was one of the last states to adopt water's edge election. Id. The water's edge
method seems to be a rational replacement for WWCR. See Harris, supra note 13, at 1091.
"Foreign-based companies, in the interest of economy and efficiency, often perform many
functions outside the United States and relatively few activities within the United States."
Id. The author draws the distinction between income-producing activities "outside the bor-
ders of the state [or country]" and those inside the borders. Id.
104 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2268 passim.
105 More U.S. States May Try Unitary Tax After Barclay's Verdict., AFX NEWS (1994).
The Organization For International Investment ("OFII")-a trade group of multinational
companies-has stated that "[tihe Supreme Court's decision [in Barclays] is either a foot-
note in U.S. Tax policy or a start of a new ominous chapter that threatens the future of not
only foreign-owned U.S. corporations, but also U.S.-based corporations with operations
abroad." Id.; see also Freud & Kolligs, supra note 20, at 344. "[Tlhe concern now is whether
the Supreme Court's decision will embolden California to drop its 'Water's edge election'
relief mechanism and encourage other states to adopt a mandatory WWCR model for mul-
tinationals." Id.
106 See Cofill, supra note 98, at 141-58 n.49 (stating that it is not feasible to return to
mandatory worldwide combined reporting); Mark Milner & Larry Elliot, Global Tax Ruling
Running Into Flak, VANCOUVER SUN, June 23, 1994, at D5 (stating that only time retalia-
tion is necessary is when state adopts unitary method of taxation). The Barclays Court
noted that a state violates foreign policy when it offends a foreign trade partner, which in
turn causes the foreign government to retaliate. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2285.
107 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281-84 & n.22 (stating that foreign countries worldwide
submitted amicus curiae briefs on behalf of Barclays); see also Freud & Kolligs, supra note
20, at 344 (stating that risk of retaliation was evident through records of complaints from
foreign governments since California's enactment of WWCR method in 1970s). These com-
plaints included "diplomatic notes from 'virtually every developed country in the world,'...
protests sent directly to the President from Heads of state of Japan, Canada, and the UK;
delays in bilateral income tax treaty negotiations; enactment in 1985 of retaliatory legisla-
tion by UK; and cancellation of a British trade mission to Florida .... "Id.; Brad Sherman,
U.S. Supreme Court Rules for California in Unitary Tax Dispute, 94 STATE TAX NoTEs 121-
33, LEXIS *4 (July 23, 1994). These governments include the European Community such
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Parliament established retaliatory legislation in response to the
Supreme Court's Container Corp. decision.' 8 This legislation, the
Finance Act of 1985 (the "Act"), attacks any United States corpo-
rations that have operations in the United Kingdom.10 9 The object
of the Act was to persuade MNCs to join in the disapproval of any
state's use of a unitary taxation method." 0 After the Barclays de-
cision in 1994, the British Chancellor expressed the United King-
dom's disappointment in the decision."' However, because Cali-
fornia revised its unitary taxation legislation, the British
Chancellor agreed not to take action against California, but stated
that the United Kingdom would retain its retaliatory powers. 1 2
Thus, it is likely that other countries that once voiced disapproval
of unitary taxation have silently adopted the United Kingdom's
lead in taking a "wait-and-see" approach.
III. PREEMPTION
Although water's edge elections have decreased the chance of
foreign retaliation in response to states' use of unitary taxation,
the Barclays decision invites Congress to "evaluate whether the
national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state auton-
as Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Freud & Kolligs, supra note 20, at 340 n.1.
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have also
voiced their disapproval. Id.
108 Finance Act, 1985, ch. 54 (Eng.); see also Stephen Fiamma, UK Retaliation Against
Unitary Taxation, The Unitary Controversy: Articles & Commentary ch. VII. Retaliation By
Our Trading Partners, 86 TAX NoTEs TODAY 153 (1986). The British Parliament approved a
bill that penalized U.S. MNCs with operations in the those states which use a unitary tax
method. In addition, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated at a meeting with
former Secretary Regan that "we [foreign nations] might be under severe pressure to take
retaliatory measures." Id.; see also Schlenger, supra note 17, at 446 (discussing how United
Kingdom may take retaliatory action if unitary taxation is not ended); Greenberg, supra
note 4, at 446. But see Statement On Introduced Bills & Joint Resolution, 99th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1977) (statement of Sen. Baucus). The Senator voiced his outrage against the United
Kingdom's enactment of the Act by proposing a bill that would have imposed a federal
income tax on any foreign corporations whose country had imposed sanctions on United
States corporation as a result of the Act. Id. Senator Baucus stated that "the enactment of
this law was [an] outrage.... [Tihe administration's decision to support federal preemption
of the unitary method was a big mistake... [and] the administration is sacrificing impor-
tant state powers to quiet a noisy ally." Id.
109 See Fiamma, supra note 108, at 159-61. The United Kingdom Act would prohibit a
United States stockholder from receiving a refund for half of the tax that the United King-
dom imposes on dividends. Id.
110 See id.; see also Statement on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 99th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1977) (statement of Senator Baucus).
111 See Kenneth Clarke, British Official Expresses Disappointment in Barclays Decision,
94 TAx NoTEs TODAY 120, 121 (1994).
112 Id.
1995] OVER THE EDGE 363
omy." 113 If Congress determines that tax uniformity is in the na-
tion's best interest, it may attempt to prohibit state unitary taxa-
tion. 1 4 The federal government may preempt a state law through
legislation of a federal domestic law or through an international
agreement. 15
A. Preemption Through Legislation
The Supremacy Clause governs situations in which federal gov-
ernment regulations conflict with state law. 116  Although the
113 See generally Greenberg, supra note 4, at 446 (quoting Hearing Before the Senate
Commission of Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of Valentine
Brooks, Partner, Brookes, Brookes & Vogel). One goal of United States tax policy is to
increase international investment. Id. Because WWCR results in decreased international
investment, it is in variance with United States policy to allow states to continue applying
this method. See Schlenger, supra note 17, at 459; Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of
International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (1981). Thus, Congress may favor
tax uniformity over state autonomy based on this rationale. See Yitzhak (Isaac) Hadari,
Tax Treaties and Their Role in the Financial Planning of the Multinational Enterprise, 20
AM. J. Comp. L. 111, 113 (1972). But see, H. Onno Ruding, U.S. Tax Policy Hurting U.S.
Multinationals Operating in the E.C., 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 4, 4 (1994) (stating that "[the gen-
eral trend in United States tax policy has been toward a more nationalistic approach that
discourages overseas investment"). Further, the President seems to be following a more
nationalistic approach. Id. Although in past administrations arms-length taxation was the
method of choice, President Clinton showed his support for California's Franchise Tax
Board by submitting an amicus curiae brief on his behalf. Id.
114 See generally Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HAS-
TINGS CONST L.Q. 69, 70 (1988). A federal law that preempts state law is constitutional
when Congress's reason for enacting the law is deemed "necessary and proper to exclude
the states from a particular area." Id.
115 U.S. CONST. art. 1., § 9, cl. 2. Congress may enact legislation domestically, requiring
states to amend their revenue codes or they may expressly preempt state law. Id. Further,
Congress may include provisions in international treaties, assuring foreign counterparts
that unitary taxation will not be applied to income earned within the United States. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2.
Though the federal government has already attempted to curb unitary taxation by for-
eign treaty, such action has not yet been challenged by the states. See Greenberg, supra
note 4, at 446. A proposed treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom,
known as the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, would have precluded the
states from using a unitary taxation method on a United Kingdom MNC doing business in
California. Id. See Convention Between the United States & United Kingdom for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., 21 U.S.T. 5620, 5677. However, the
Senate rejected this version of the treaty and the treaty was ratified with a reservation that
stated that the treaty would not apply to any United States political subdivision or local
authority. Id.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. X. "jWihen a Congressional regulation of commerce expressly
precludes state regulation of the matter regulated, the supremacy clause controls." Id.; see
also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause states that "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. .. ." Id. See generally
Marilyn P. Westerfield, Comment, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does Congress
Want?, 58 U. CiN. L. REv. 263, 263 (1989) (stating that "[flederal preemption requires that
federal law take priority over state and local law").
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Supremacy Clause provides that any federal law preempts a state
law, this is not so where federal power to regulate in that area
does not exist. 11
The Constitution specifically grants Congress a great deal of
power in regulating commerce with foreign nations."18 However,
congressional power is subject to constitutional limitations. 19 The
Tenth Amendment confirms that, in some instances, certain pow-
ers are reserved to the states.120 Congressional action which inter-
feres with this right of state independence is therefore void.'
2
'
Hence, in ascertaining whether Congress has the power to require
the states to regulate against unitary taxation, it is necessary to
determine whether state sovereignty in this area is protected by a
Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional power.
122
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the Tenth Amend-
ment narrowly when deciding whether Congress may subject a
state's private citizens to generally applicable laws,'12  a congres-
sional action that regulates a state function poses a different con-
117 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). It is to be presumed
that the states' police power cannot be preempted by a federal law unless it is within the
federal government's power and intent to do so. Id.
118 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418-19 (1992) (discussing Con-
gress's power under Commerce Clause); see also Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). "In international relations and with respect to foreign inter-
course and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with
unified and adequate national power." Id. (quoting Board of Trustees v. United States, 289
U.S. 48, 59 (1933)).
119 See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). The Tenth Amendment "ex-
pressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion
that impairs the states' integrity, or their ability to function efficiently in a federal system."
Id.; see also, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (stating that
Congress's power to preempt states is limited when exercising its power to tax and regulate
commerce).
120 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-18 (1992) (stating that what is
not conferred to Congress is reserved for states). Id.
121 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (stating that "[t]he Constitution
created a Federal Government of limited powers"); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
844 (1976) (stating that Constitution in all its provisions looks to an indestructible union,
composed of indestructible states) (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725
(1869)).
122 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992) (noting that "[tihe Tenth
Amendment ... directs us to determine ... whether an incident of state sovereignty is
protected by a limitation on an Article I power"). Id.
123 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985)
(holding congressional wage and hour regulation of state employees constitutional, despite
Transit Authority's Tenth Amendment claim); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968)
(stating that congressional amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act protecting all em-
ployees employed in enterprise involved in commerce were not unconstitutional). But see
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855-56 (finding congressional amendments to Fair
Labor Standards Act extending minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to state em-
ployees constitutional).
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stitutional issue.12 4 By requiring states to alter their tax codes to
comply with government taxation policies, Congress is using the
states to regulate beyond its enumerated powers.
Recently, in New York v. United States,1 25 the Supreme Court
held that the Tenth Amendment limits Congress's power to com-
pel the states to regulate. 12 In New York, Congress had enacted
legislation requiring states to provide for the disposal of radioac-
tive waste. 127 States failing to comply were obligated to take title
to and possession of the waste, and would be liable for damages
incurred by the owner of the waste.128 New York State challenged
this legislation, claiming it overstepped the boundary between
federal and state authority. 1 29
In New York, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that
"Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.' ,130 The Court held that the federal
government could urge states to comply with federal policy by pro-
viding the states with incentives, because the ultimate decision is
then left to the residents of the state. 13 1 However, the Court rea-
soned, the federal government could not compel the states to regu-
late, as the accountability of both state and federal officials would
be expelled. 132 Accordingly, the Court in New York held the fed-
eral legislation unconstitutional because it interfered with state
legislative processes by directly compelling states to prescribe and
enforce a regulatory program.133
124 See National Leagues of Cities, 426 U.S. at 844 (distinguishing between federal gov-
ernment's right to enact laws that regulate individuals from states' sovereign power to
regulate state function).
125 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
126 Id. at 2414, 2434 (holding that Tenth Amendment reserves to states power to decide
whether to provide for disposal of radioactive wastes generated within its borders).127 Id. at 2414 (describing Congress's Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment
Act of 1985).
128 Id. at 2416.
129 Id. at 2412-14 (reviewing State of New York's contention that Tenth Amendment
reserves power to regulate waste to states).130 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
131 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2421 (explaining that state residents can effectively decide
whether or not to accept congressional incentives through election of state officials).
132 Id. at 2424. "Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it,
state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials
remain accountable to the people." Id.
133 Id. at 2428. "[Blecause an instruction to state governments to take title to waste,
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to
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By remaining silent on the issue of state taxation of MNCs, Con-
gress has given state residents the power to decide, through their
elected officials, which form of taxation best fulfills their states'
needs. By contrast, an act of Congress that would compel all
states to employ arms-length taxation methods would curtail the
accountability of state and federal executives, and would therefore
be unconstitutional under the New York rule.13 4
The New York rule confirmed that where the federal govern-
ment seeks to impose its policies upon the states, it must do so by
directly legislating its policies upon the states' citizens. 135 The fed-
eral government, however, may not attempt to impose its policies
upon a state's citizens by requiring the state to legislate in favor of
federal policy.' 3 6
B. Preemption by Treaty
In determining whether the federal government may expand its
regulatory power to prohibit state unitary taxation through trea-
ties, the courts must do more than refer to the Tenth Amendment,
because treaties made under the United States are declared the
supreme law of the land. '3 7 Just as an act of Congress is the
supreme law of the land only if it passes constitutional muster, 138
a treaty is the supreme law of the land only when made under the
authority of the United States. 139 Nevertheless, there are limits to
regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that
Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two." Id.
134 Id. at 2429. Although the United States argued that Tenth Amendment limitations
on congressional directives to state governments can be overcome "where the federal inter-
est is sufficiently important to justify state submission," the Court dismissed this argu-
ment, stating that no matter how important the federal government's interest is, the Con-
stitution never gives Congress the authority to compel the states to regulate. Id.
135 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435 (1992). "The Federal Government
may not compel the states to enact or administer a federal regulation program." Id.
136 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 passim (1992). But see id. at 2443-47
(White, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justice disagreed with this rationale, arguing that
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), should govern this case,
even if it does not involve a congressional law applicable to both states and private parties.
Id. at 2443-44.
137 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (stat-
ing that Article VI proclaims Constitution itself, any law pursuant to Constitution, and
treaties supreme to all other laws made by state and local governments); Scandinavian
Airline Sys. Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 36 (1961) (declaring that treaties
are supreme law of land and are binding on all federal state courts).
138 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 passim (1992).
139 See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. States do not have the power to negotiate treaties
with foreign nations. Id. Rather, the Constitution reserves this power for the executive
branch. Id.; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (stating that treaty is not
valid if it violates another constitutional provision).
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the federal government's authority.140 The extent to which these
limits exist, however, is not entirely clear.
The Supreme Court first examined the federal government's
treaty-making power seventy-five years ago, in Missouri v. Hol-
land.141 In Missouri, the United States had entered into a treaty
with Great Britain, providing for the protection of migratory birds
in the United States and Canada. 142 Although Congress could not
enact this legislation domestically due to powers reserved to the
states under the Tenth Amendment, it essentially achieved the
same result by entering into a treaty which controlled the killing
of wild game within state borders. 143 The states challenged this
compact, claiming that Congress was simply doing by treaty what
it was forbidden to do legislatively.'" The Missouri Court held
that where a treaty, by its terms, does something that the Consti-
tution forbids, it is outside the federal government's power to
enter into that treaty.145 The Court reasoned that if the treaty
power was not limited by the Constitution, "the Federal Govern-
ment itself, as well as the several States, would be at the mercy of
the President and the Senate."' 4 6 . Nevertheless, the Missouri
Court found that the treaty between the United States and Great
Britain was valid because, by the construction of the treaty, the
act of controlling the taking of wild animals from within state bor-
ders was not necessarily required by the treaty. 47 Similarly,
where Congress would be forbidden to act legislatively to prohibit
states from employing unitary taxation methods, 4 it should be
precluded from attempting to achieve the same end by entering
into a treaty that guarantees a foreign nation immunity from uni-
tary taxation at the state level.
140 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (stating that there are qualifica-
tions to Congress's treaty-making power).
141 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
142 Id. at 416.
143 Id. at 432. The United States enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918
which implemented a treaty that the United States entered into with Great Britain. Id. at
431. The act "prohibited the killing, capturing or selling any of the migratory birds included
in the terms of the treaty." Id.
144 Id. at 432. A federal act prohibiting the killing of such birds was struck down as
unconstitutional in the United States District Court. Id. (citations omitted).
145 Id. (stating that 'what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the
powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do").
146 Id.
147 Holland, 252 U.S. at 434-35.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 81-96 (arguing that Congress may not enact legis-
lation that compels states to change their tax policies with respect to taxation of MNCs).
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Thirty-seven years after Missouri, the Supreme Court decided
Reid v. Covert.149 In this case, Mrs. Covert was accused of killing
her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, at an
airbase in England. 150 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Status of Forces Agreement, effective in Great Britain, gives
Great Britain primary jurisdiction to try dependents accompany-
ing American servicemen for those offenses which violate both the
foreign nation's law and United States law. 15 Accordingly, Mrs.
Covert was tried for murder by a court-martial, pursuant to Arti-
cle 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 52 Mrs. Covert
was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to life in prison.
1 53
She challenged the decision in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia on constitutional grounds, claiming that
the court-martial violated her right to a trial by jury.15 4 The Dis-
trict Court held the court-martial procedure constitutional, but
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the
Supremacy Clause provides that all treaties made under the au-
thority of the United States are the supreme law of the land,' 55
such treaties must be consistent with the rights set forth in the
Constitution. 156 Accordingly, the Court held that Mrs. Covert, as a
149 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
150 Id. at 3. Mrs. Covert was staying with her husband on the military base. Id.
151 See id. at 16. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") Status of Forces
Agreement, 4 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846,
gives Great Britain jurisdiction over military servicemen's dependents. Id. However, the
Agreement also contains provisions requiring the foreign nation to provide procedural safe-
guards for United States citizens tried in foreign courts under the NATO agreement. Id.
152 Id. The court-martial asserted jurisdiction over Mrs. Covert under Article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which provides: "The following persons are subject to this
code: . . . (11) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving
with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the
United States .... " Id. at 3-4.
153 Id. at 4. The Air Force Board of Review affirmed this judgment, but was reversed by
the Court of Military Appeals for prejudicial error. Id. While Mrs. Covert was being held in
the United States pending retrial, her attorney filed a writ of habeas corpus with the
United States District Court, challenging the trial on constitutional grounds. Id.
154 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). The United States District Court held that
the military trial of Mrs. Covert was constitutional because the provisions of Article III and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which require a trial by jury, "did not protect an Ameri-
can citizen when he was tried by the American Government in foreign lands for offenses
committed there and that Congress could provide for the trial of such offenses in any man-
ner it saw fit so long as the procedures established were reasonable and consonant with due
process." Id.
155 Id. at 16.
156 Id. at 17-18. The Court stated:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the govern-
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civilian, could not constitutionally be tried by a military court-
martial.'5 7 The Reid Court distinguished Missouri v. Holland on
the ground that it concerned a Tenth Amendment right, which re-
served power to the states, as opposed to the constitutionally enu-
merated right to a trial by jury addressed in Reid v. Covert.158
Although the Reid decision suggests that inherent Tenth
Amendment rights are afforded less protection than enumerated
constitutional rights, the Missouri case was not decided on this
premise. 159 The Missouri Court found the disputed treaty consti-
tutional because it did not require the states to take the action
that was being challenged on constitutional grounds. 60 The Court
made this clear when it suggested that the federal government
should not be allowed to do by treaty what it is forbidden to do by
statute.'
6 1
It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would allow the fed-
eral government to do through a "back door" policy what it has
prohibited through domestic legislation. Thus, a treaty entered
into by the federal government which would, by its terms, forbid
states from employing unitary taxation would likely be viewed by
the Court as directly violating the inherent Tenth Amendment
right the Missouri court was protecting.
ment or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself
and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to author-
ize what the constitution forbids ....
Id.
157 Id. at 41.
158 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 18. The Court stated:
There is nothing in State of Missouri v. Holland ... which is contrary to the position
taken here. There the Court carefully noted that the treaty involved was not inconsis-
tent with any specific provision of the Constitution. The court was concerned with the
Tenth Amendment which reserves to the States or the people all power not delegated
to the National Government. To the extent that the United States can validly make
treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power to the National Govern-




161 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 417 (1920). The Court noted:
If it had been suggested that, although Congress had no power to control the taking of
wild game within the borders of any State, yet indirectly by means of a treaty with
some foreign power it could acquire the power and by this means its long arm could
reach into the States and take food from the tables of their people, who can for one
moment believe that such a constitution would have been ratified?
370 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
IV. CONCLUSION
Unitary taxation has been criticized widely for unfairly taxing
the income of multijurisdictional corporations. Nevertheless, the
Barclays decision confirms the constitutionality of the unitary
method of taxation with respect to foreign-based MNCs as well as
multistate corporations and domestic MNCs. Although the Bar-
clays holding may be criticized for creating a temptation for states
to adopt unitary taxation in an effort to increase state revenues,
the threat of foreign retaliation by foreign MNCs will likely dis-
suade states from taking such action. Furthermore, the availabil-
ity of the water's edge election provides a middle ground in an ef-
fort to prevent foreign retaliation against those states that are
unwilling to adopt the federal government's arms-length method
of taxation.
Nonetheless, discontent with unitary taxation methods does
still exist. Thus, it is possible that Congress will respond to polit-
ical pressure in this area by enacting legislation domestically, re-
quiring the states to abolish unitary taxation methods. Such ac-
tion, however, would diminish the accountability of state and
federal officials and would therefore violate the states' Tenth
Amendment rights. Alternatively, the federal government may
attempt to evade unitary taxation by entering into treaties with
foreign governments, guaranteeing that unitary taxation will not
occur at the state level. Although the federal government has al-
ready entered into such a treaty, it has not yet been challenged by
the states. It is probable, however, that the Supreme Court, based
on precedent, would find that the federal government may not at-
tempt to do by treaty what is prohibited by statute. Thus, any
attempt by the federal government to abolish unitary taxation
would necessarily be void as a matter of law.
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